10e key to Sartre's conception of the God-project is to be found in his ontology, and specifically in his reaction to traditional Aristotelian-Thomistic logic, wh'icb be ultimately overtums. In keepmg with this logic, a pair of contradictory terms cannot jointly be true or false. 1Ous, if being is posited as a universal, non-being must of necessity be an error. Altbough certain ancients, including Heraclitus and the negative theologians, implicitly cballenged this logic, it was not uotil the nineteenth century that philosopbers began to systematize the structures of ontological contradiction. Por Hegel, contradiction was the moving principle of the world, and as a result, being was not static but in a process of becoming. Sartre also envisions a being-in-becoming. In contrast to Hegel, bowever, be maintains that the synthesis of being and nothingness always short-eircuits.
According to Sartrean ontology, though being and nothingness are logical contradictories, botb are true modes of being. Sartre chooses to posit them as contradictories ratber tban contraries because contraries need not jointly exhaust a universe of discourse. Contraries are thus inadequate to the task of elucidating a fundamental ontotogy. Moreover, while a contrary is an external negation of a universal, a contradictory is an internat negation, which Sartre identifies with the notbingness of consciousness itsetf.
The following square of ontological opposition will help clarify Sartrean logic.
A.
all being is I.
some being is E. no being is O.
some being is not
In this scheme, the proposition "A" refers to the being of the In-itself and the proposition "0" to the being of the For-itself. Logically speaking, the "A" precedes and is the condition of the "0" insofar as the latter is a negation of the former. It should he noted, however, that while the "A" takes logical precedence over the "0," the "0," as the Iived-experience of consciousness, has an existential priority over the "A. " For this reason it is possible to speak of Sartre as an "existential logician. "
Whereas in the Aristotelian-Thomistic system, the "E" and the "0" are both false, in the Sartrean system, the "E" is false but the "0" is true. The internal negation of the For-itself ("0") is simultaneously an affirmation of the In-itself (" A") as world. The "I" is subsequently affinned when the For-itself passes from a pre-reflective consciousness of being to a reflective consciousness of "this" or "that." In contrast to the "A," the "I" results from an external negation through which "some being" is distinguished from the being that it is not. As with the "0," the "A" is logically prior to the "I." This is precisely what Sartre calls tbe "transphenomenality of heing. "
The relationship that Sartre establisbes between the "A" and tbe "I" confirms tbe Aristotelian-Thomistic principle that while the subaltemate particular is implied by the universal, the universal cannot perforce be derived from the subaltern. Thus, tbough consciousness experiences an apodictic certainty of its own non-heing, the existence of universal nothingness ("E") cannot logically be derived from consciousness. Were it possible to do so, then heing would vanish and the entire logical edifice would collapse. Surprisingly enough, this is precisely what occurs in certain religious systems, such as that of the mystics.
Notwithstanding, the "E" can, in keeping with the Sartrean system, exist as an imaginary being. It is posited by tbe "0" not through an intemal but an extemal negation of tbe "A." In contrast to the extemal negation which gives eise to the "I," this particular negation does not negate one being with reference to another ("this" as opposed to "that"); rather, it negates "all being" with reference to itself. This operation, insofar as itjuxtaposes nothing with nothing, is nullified, and in reality heing remains intact. Nevertheless, through an act of bad faith, consciousness denies tbe failure of its negation, and from tbe quasi-nothingness of the world it attempts to endow itself with the being that it lacks. In this context, the "E" might be called the imaginary In-itself of consciousness. It might also, in certain circumstances, be described as the "substance" of God.
The atheism of Sartre is fOfDlulated in terms of this basic logical system.
Were the divinity to exist in reality, it would be tbe synthesis of the propositions "A" and "0," that is, of being and nothingness. Such a synthesis "haunts" pre-retlective con~iousness as the totality that it forever strives to become. A pseudo-being, it is not an object of pre-reflective consciousness but rather its ultimate possibility. WCet etre, WSartre states, Wsurgit en meme temps qutelle [la conscience], a la fois dans son coeur et hors dteile, il est la transcendance absolue dans Itimmanence absolue, iI nty a priorit6 ni de lui sur la conscience ni de la conscience sur lui: ils/ont couplew (Etre 134). This statement is crucial to an understanding of much religious ontology. It contains, in secular terms, the key to the paradox of a God who is absolutely transcendent and yet who is experienced at the heart of human interiority.
The Sartrean dyad of the human and tbe divine is not the For-itselfand the In-Itself~ut instead the For-itself and witself" as the synthesis of the For-itself and the In-itself. This synthesis, however, is unrealizable to the extent that the For-itself, despite its negations, is unable to appropriate the being of the In-itself. Its In-itself, as the contrary of heing, remains imaginary, as does the God that it uItirnately bopes to become.
Nonetheless, one might justifiably wonder why the synthesis of heing and nothingness is impossible. Sartre, to be sure, arguesthat the In-itself and the For-itself are contradictory terms. Yet in contrast to Aristotelian-Thomistic ontology, they are both true dimensions of being. Were it not for the presence of a certain footnote in L 'EIre et le neant, we might be tempted to use the anti-scholastic logic of Sartre to undertake an articulation of the synthesis of heing and nothingness that he insists is impossible. The note, however, which merits citing in its entirety, clarifies the problem:
On sera tente peut-atre de traduire la trinite enviaagee en tenne. hegeliens et de faire de I'en-soi la th~se, du pour-lOi I'antith~se et de l'en-lOi-pour-soi ou Valeur la synthese. Mais iI raut observer iei que, si le Pour-soi manque de l'En-soi, l'En-soi ne manque pas du Pour-soi. 11 n'y a done pa. r6eiprocite dan. I'opposition. En un mot, le Pour-soi demeure inessentiel et eontingentpar rapport~l'En-BOi et e'est eette inessentialite que nous appelions plus haut se faetieite. En outre, la synth~se ou Valeur serait bien un retour~la th~se, done un retour sur BOi, mai. eomme elle est totalite irrealisable, le Pour-soi n'est pa. un moment qui puisse etre depass6. Comme tel, sa nature le rapproche beaueoup plus des realities 'ambigue.' de Kierkegaard. En outre, nous trouvons iei un double jeu d'oppositions unilaterale.: le Pour-80i, en un sens, manque de l'En-soi, qui ne manque pa. de lui; mais en un autre, iI manque de IOn possible (ou Pour-soi manquant) qui ne manque pa. non plu. de lui. (138).
A synthesis ofbeing and nothingness is therefore impossible because ofthe radical aIterity of the two terms. Clearly, the In-itself does not affect the 203 For-itself, either internally or extemally.TheFor-itself.ontheotherhand.as the internal negation of the In-itself, makes a world appear on the ground of heing. Yet this world is precisely an appearancethat disappears with the For-itself. Tbus, though the For-itself ia ontologically bound to the In-itself, its action is unable to affect the In-itself in its being. It is in this eontext that Sartre states: -La negation ne saurait atteindre le noyau d'etre de Petre qui est plenitude absolue et entiere positivit6" (EIre SO). The only effect that the For-itself produees is an appearance wbieb ultimately vanishes with its death.
This state of affairs bas led certain erities to conelude that the ontology of Sartre is a dualism. He bimself would maintain that bis system is monistie, specifically because the For-itself ia adependent being that is "born, " according to the ontological proof, ·portee sur UD atre qui n'est pas elle" (EIre 28). Non-heing does not issue from beina, wbieb is full positivity, nor is its "birth" the synthesis of a previous dialectical opposition. Rather, it is an unparalleled occurrence, similar in its unieity (although ontologically the reverse) to the divine ereation ex nihilo. For Sartre, however, the question of the "whenee" of nothingness is a moot one that metaphysieians and others have attempted to address but that he, as a phenomenologist, ehooses to let drop.
Sartrean ontology, it might be said, is a monism of both being and nothingness. Were it not monistie, then it would ultimately disintegrate into the idealistie ontology intuited by the mystics and exponents of negative theology. In Sartre, nothingness is inextricably intertwined with being, but it can never transcend its mode of non-being. In the negative theologians, on the other hand, nothingness ean be disengaged from being. Sueh a disengagement for Sartre would be the eonsequenee of an aet of derealization through whieh consciousness atternpts to hypostatize its nothingness and endow itself with the being that it lacks. This derealization would he a flight from the original intuition of freedom and an aet of profound bad faith. In strietly ontologieal terms, therefore, Sartre's atheism can be viewed as a refusal to grant nothingness a status of being independent of the In-itself.
Sartre rejects God not only in general philosophieal terms but also in the eontext of the Christian Trinity. Aeeording to the Hegelian eoneeption of the Trinity, indicated by Sartre in the aforementioned footnote from L 'Etre et le neanl, the Father and Son, as thesis and antithesis, would be integrated into a synthesis whieh is the Holy Spirit. In analyzing this triad, John MeTaggart Ellis MeTaggart adds the following erueial point: "In so far as they (the Father and the Son] are laken to be correlative with the Holy Ghost, as on the same level with the latter, the Father and the Son are simply abstractions which the thinker makes from the concrete reality of the Holy Ghost" (204). Thus, because "the result of the dialectic is never a triad but a 'single truth'" (Thatcher 93), the Hegelian God is not triune but, in fact, the Holy Spirit itself.
Were the Persons of the Trinity applied to the Sartrean God, then the In-itself, as thesis, would be God the Father, and the For-itself, as antithesis, would be God the Sone The Holy Spirit, on the other hand, would be the synthesis of these two heings-the divine monad that haunts consciousness f~om the moment of its original upsurge. In order to achieve tbis synthesis, consciousness, as a Christ figure, is prepared to sacrifice its own ontological status in the world. Through the selfsame reversal that appears in much mystical theology, it simultaneously negatesthe world as heing and itself as non-heing. The goal is to endow the In-itself with the fluidity of the For-itself and the For-itself with the density of the In-itself. Because of the alterity of the terms, however, the In-itself-For-itself remains imaginary, and hence the ever unrealizable ideal of all human endeavor. It is in this context that Sartre concludes L 'EIre elle neanl: "Ainsi la passion de I'homme est-elle inverse de celle du Christ, car I'homme se perd en tant qu 'homme pour que Dieu naisse. Mais I' id6e de Dieu' est contradictoire et nous nous perdons en vain; I'homme est une passion inutile" (708).
Sartre, however, describes the Holy Spirit not only as the impossible In-itself but as the other. In the famous passage of Les MOlS, where he reveals his inability as a child to believe in God the Father, he states: "Mais I' Autre restait, I'Invisible, le . This Holy Spirit, as Sartre would clarify, is what survived of God in the secular culture of late nineteenth-and early twentieth-eentury Europe. It was not so much a Person, in the theological sense, as the absolute ideal through which consciousness articulated its existence.
Notwithstanding, the Sartrean Holy Spirit is also a projection of the human other. In an effort to grasp the "Us-object," that is, the whole of human subjectivity as an objective being in the world, consciousness posits an "etre-regardant qui ne peutjamais etre regard6" (EIre 495). Such a being would be capable of constituting humanity in its totality. Yet like the In-itself-For-itself, it remains a Iimiting-eoncepl. Even if it existed, it would unite human beings extemallyinarelationshipofalterity.Ultimately.this means that there is no 205 ontological union with the other. Just as consciousness is alienated from being, so too is it alienated from all other consciousnesses.
The logic of this social alienation is to be found in the theory of being-for-others propounded in L 'EIre et le neanl and refmed in the Cr;l;que.
According to Sartre, the other is revealed to consciousness through an alienating look which objectifies it and reduces it to the status of a thing. Though consciousness aspires to the In-itself of things, it does so not in the hope of becoming a thing itself but of achieving the ideal synthesis of the In-itself-For-itself. In order to overcome the threat posed by the other, therefore, consciousness initiates a similar project of reification. It is for this reason that Sartre fOrDlulated the now classic dictum that the essence of human relations is not a'"M;Ise;n but a conflict. Because consciousness can experience itself as a thing in the presence of the other, it is apodictically certain that the other exists as a For-itself. It could be argued, however, that the other is not DOwn interiorly by consciousness but is rather the logical consequence of its own exteriority under tbe look. Were consciousness to interiorize the subjectivity of the other, then it might, in keeping witb the Sartrean system, identify the ontological project of tbe otber, and all that this project entails in the world, as its OWD. In the Cr;l;que, Sartre does allow for such a reciprocity of buman action in the moment of revolution, when individuals attempt to transcend their mutual alienation. Yet he does not recognize it in the personal relationships of parents and children, lovers. and friends. For all intents and purposes, then. any concrete human bonding remains absent from his thought.
Nevertheless, a Milse;n is recognized not only by various existentialists but by numerous religious exponents who project it. Iike the Iimiting-eoncept ofthe Sartrean "Us-object, " to the infinite. The Churcb, for example, as the mystical body of Christ, or the Mass, as the communion of the faithful, is a Milse;n that is taken to be God. A Mils~;n, moreover, is tbe foundation of Christian ethics as expressed in the seven corporal works of mercy ("For I was an hungred, and ye gave me meat" Matt. 25:25). It might even be said that the Holy Spirit is a Milsein to the extent that it is believed to manifest itself among those who meet in Christ's name. Whereas the absolute other described by Sartre is a projection of tbe real other, the Milse;n of the religious would be an extrapolation of an imaginary other. Following Sartrean logic, tbis imaginary other would be posited by consciousness in an attempt either to appease the real other or to establish with certain others a complicity in the context of group or class exploitation. For Sartre this complicity would account for the myth of "brotherly love" in what are fundamentally unethical societies. Althougb Sartre defines God as an impossibility, be does not posit an a prior; atheism since, like belief, atheism is in the fmal analysis a choice of consciousness. Indeed, atheists are those who have "chosen" once and for all that God does not exist. Wbile they are in "good faith,· believers are in "bad faith" to the extent that their choice is founded on adesire to escape the anguish of freedom. (Agnostics, it might be said, are in bad faith insofar as they choose not to choose.) Through religion, Sartre concludes, humans ultimately attempt to create the apparatus for transforming their own nothingness into the totality of being. The effort, as he insists, is nevertheless doomed to failure.
Thetheological upshot of Sartrean ontology is that God cannot be made to exist by human fiat. Wbat for centuries humans have thought to have leamed, either through reason or faith, about a transcendent divinity, is in fact the truth of their own reality. It might be said that for Sartre human beings are God, not in a supematural sense, but precisely to the extent that everything regarding the being of God is a corollary of human action.
While the philosophical atheism of Sartre is undeniable, the question of personal beliefis more problematical. Sartre was aware ofthis beliefthat "dares not speak its name," and discussed it on various occasions. At the end of Les MOlS, after recalling the heroes of his childhood literature, he writes: "Je ne rel~ve que d'eux qui ne rel~vent que de Dieu et je ne crois pas en Dieu. Allez vous y reconnaitre. Pour ma part, je ne m'y reconnais pas et je me demande parfois si je ne joue pas A qui perd gagne et ne m'applique A pi~tiner mes espoirs d'autrefois pour que tout me soit rendu au centuple. En ce cas je serais Philoctete: magnifique et puant, cet infinne a donn6 jusqu'A son arc, sans condition: mais, souterrainement, on peut~tre sOr qu'il attend SB r6compense" (213). In the game of loser wins, Sartre could be seen as the most extreme sort of negative theologian. Not only does he deny the existence of God, as do such believers as Tillich, but he is even indi fferent to the matter. This indifference, however, was achieved only after a Iifetime of hold reflection. It is in factthe final triumph over the spirit of seriousness. Wbether winner or loser, Sartre chooses to view his life in the context of agame. It is his freedom that allows hirn to do so. It is freedom, moreover, that is ultimately vindicated. He thus
